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Project Ranking Using Partial Ranks
Jiali Ju, Pei Zhang, Timothy Anderson

Department of Engineering and Technology Management, Portland State University, Portland, OR - USA
Abstract--A competition was recently held for new elder care
technologies and a method was needed for selecting an audience
favorite project. Since each of the eight projects received a half
hour presentation time slot spread out over a full day,
attendance varied significantly with morning projects having a
much lower attendance. An algorithm was desired that was
robust with respect to varying evaluator. A new algorithm for
aggregating ranks from a large number of incomplete judgment
was developed and applied to the projects to select a
winner. This paper presents the new algorithm, tests the new
approach against others in the application, and discusses
relative tradeoffs.

I. INTRODUCTION
Voting systems have a long history, and are still being
researched. This time, referring to a competition event, we
were able to design a new voting system for the ranking
process. After designing the paper ballots, distribute to the
audiences and collect the data, the new algorithm had been
tested.
Regarding to the situation, the new algorithm should be
able to deal with partial ranking, tie rankings and determine
the full ranking rather than simply pick single winner. The
algorithm we designed to address these features, and refer to
it as a “Sequential Pair Rank” system, which is a pairwisecomparison-based voting system. We will introduce the
algorithm, and study its abilities. This system has also been
coded on R platform, and the computational performance was
also examined.
The Sequential Pair Rank system appears to be new
among the single-winner voting systems. Warren D. Smith
defines a single winner in an election as “the candidate
maximizing the total sum (over all voters) of benefit, wins
[1].” When people think of voting, several system are
frequently thought of, including Majority Voting [2] (the
candidate gets the most vote wins), Borda Count [3] (award
N-K points to the Kth-ranked candidate in the vote with the
preference order, picking the maximum points as the winner),
and Weighted Voting [4] (award weight points from Rank 1
to N, count the number of ranks that each candidate gets and
pick up the maximum score as the winner).
The voting system provides a social choice function that
takes as input a profile of cast ballots and produces as output
the name of the election winner[5]. This new algorithm is
based on the principle of the “systems in which each vote is a
preference ordering of the candidates” [1]. The preference
orders from each judge is then compared against every
permutation of the eight projects (candidates). By providing

the most-fitted full ranks for the candidates, which would
provide a new angle of view on different voting systems for
the future studies.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There is a great range of voting systems developed over
the centuries. Warren D. Smith has divided them into five
categories of single-winner voting systems [1]:
1. Systems that ignore the votes;
2. Systems in which each vote is the name of a single
candidate;
3. Systems in which each vote is a preference ordering of the
candidates;
4. Systems in which each vote is a real N-vector;
5. Sarvo-Range voting.
The new algorithm – the “Sequential Pair Rank” would fit
in the third category, “Systems in which each vote is a
preference ordering of the candidates”. Even within just this
one category, there are about 30 different single-winner
voting systems with several very different kinds of
approaches.
Several systems were based on pairwise-comparison,
which provide the comparing processes between either a
random pair of the candidates, or among each pair of the
candidates. Our Sequential Pair Rank system is also based on
this methodology. Some popular voting systems with the
pairwise comparison are: Gibbard Random Pair (Allan
Gibbard, 1973) [6], Black’s System (Duncan Black, 1958) [7],
Improvement of Dodgson’s System, A. H. Copeland’s
System (A. H. Copeland, 1951) [8], Arrow-Raynaud Pairwise
Elimination (Kenneth J. Arrow & Herve Raynaud, 1986) [9],
Smith Sets, and Banks Sets (J. Banks, 1985) [10].
Several systems were associated with a scoring system by
awarding different scores to different rank orders, and pick
the candidate with the maximum score as the winner. Some
popular voting systems with this procedure are: Nauru
(Benjamin Reilly, 2002) [11], Borda Count (1781) [3],
Condorcet Least-reversal System (1785) [12], and NansonBaldwin Elimination (Edward J. Nanson, 1882) [13].
Several of the systems were using the majority voting,
considering the candidate which gets the most votes as the
winner. The usages of probabilities were extended the
application ways of the majority voting in practices. Some
widely used voting systems with the majority voting
procedures contains: Instant Runoff Voting (Nicolaus
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Tideman, 1995) [14], Coombs STV System (C.H. Coombs,
1954) [15], Bucklin, and Woodall’s Descending Acquiescing
Coalitions method (Douglas Woodall, 1997) [16].
There are also some existing algorithms with similar logic
to the Sequential Pair Rank. One example would be Gibbard
Random Pair (Allan Gibbard, 1973) [6]. In this system, each
vote is a preference order among the candidates. Select 2
candidates at random (all pairs equally likely), then perform a
2-candidate election among them by ignoring the other N-2
candidates in each preference ordering [1]. Similar to our
system, Gibbard Random Pair uses a pairwise-comparison
procedure for the final winner. The key difference is that
Gibbard Random Pair selects only 2 candidates out of the N
candidates. From the literature review, we haven’t found any
algorithm which could tolerate partial rank, ties and
determine the full ranks at the same time as the Sequential
Pair Rank System. The detailed procedure of this algorithm
would be described in the following part.

K = 1, 2, 3… N-1; m = 1, 2, 3… N!
3. The optimal ranking is the maximize sum value of Fm:

max  F
n

m

n = 1, 2, 3…N-1

Example:
There are 3 candidates and 4 voters. N=3, N! = 6. The
tables below show the process to calculate the fit value F. The
sum fit of permutation 1 is 4. Then repeat the process for the
full 6 permutations to find the maximum sum fit value.
Step 1: Generate the permutations of 3 candidates ranks
TABLE 1A: RANK 3 CANDIDATES BY 4 VOTERS

Voters

As it is mentioned, each ballot is a preference order list of
all candidates. If there are N candidates, the number of the
full permutation of all possible votes would be N!.
Comparing the orders in the ballots with each permutation‘s
order of N candidates by matching the preference order of
each sequential pair. The next step is to accumulate the
number of preference order fit for each permutation. The goal
is to find the maximum fit number among all permutations
and return the optimal permutation(s).
Procedure:
1. Generate the permutations of all possible votes, P .
2. V is the list of preference order from ballots. Vjk is the

kth candidate and (k+1)th candidate in the permutation
does fit with the preference order of the same adjacent
pair in the ballot (i.e., either both in ascending order or
both in descending order). So a non-fit, Fmk  0 , is

defined as the rank order of pair in permutation violates
the order of same pair in the ballot. If any rank in each
pair is 0, in the case of partial ranking ( V jk  V jk 1  0 ),
then the order is treated as a non-fit. If the rank is a tie in
each pair, the order is also considered as a non-fit.
If

V jk V jk 1  0 and

otherwise, Fmk  0 .

V jk  V jk 1
Pmk  Pmk 1

0 ,

m

4. Return the Mth permutation if F M is the maximize value
of Step 3.

III. ALGORITHM: SEQUENTIAL PAIR RANK

order/rank of the kth candidate given by the jth voter. Pmk
is the rank/order of the kth candidate in the mth
permutation. F is the fitness matrices for each candidate’s
preference order. Fmk  1 means the preference order of

n1

Candidates
N1
N2
1
1
2
1
3
0
4
1

N3
2
1
1
3

3
2
3
2

TABLE 1B: PERMUTATIONS OF RANKING 3 CANDIDATES

Candidates
Permutations N1
N2
1
1
2
1
3
3
4
3
5
2
6
2

N3
2
3
1
2
3
1

3
2
2
1
1
3

Step 2: Compare Voter matrix (Table 1a) with Permutation 1
to determine the fit
The rule of fit is to find the same preference orders of the
same adjacent pair in both voters’ choices and in the
permutations. In the fitness matrices, an element equals to 1
represents as the preference order fit and 0 indicates the
preference order does not fit. We examine the preference
order of each adjacent candidate pair in each permutation
with the pairs ranking from all 4 voters. The follow chart are
the examples that how to determine fitness.

Fmk  1 ;
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Permutations N1
2

N2

Voters

N3

1

3

N1
1

2

N2

N3

1

2

3

Preference order: N1 > N2

Preference order: N1 > N2

Both agree on N1 > N2

fit = 1
Figure 1a: preference order fit example

Permutations N1
2

N2

Voters

N3

1

3

N1
1

2

N2
1

N3
2

3

Preference order: N2 > N3

Preference order: N2 < N3
Disagree on N2 vs N3
fit = 0

Figure 1b: preference order does not fit example

Voters N1
2

N2
1

N3
1

Voters N1
3

2

Preference order: N1 = N2

N2
0

N3
1

2

Incomplete rank for N1

Tie

Partial ranking

fit = 0

fit = 0
Figure 2a and 2b: tie, and partial ranking examples

As shown in the above, Voter 1 prefers N1 to N2 (N1 >
N2). In Permutation 2: the rank of N1 is also higher than N2.
Therefore, the preference order fit of N1 vs N2 is 1. Similarly,
Voter 1 prefers N3 to N2 (N2 < N3). But the rank of N2 is
higher than N3 in the Permutation 2 (N2 > N3). So the fit of
N2 vs N3 is 0 as the preference order does not fit with each
other. If there is a tie between N1 and N2 (from Voter 2, N1
= N2), the fit value of N1 vs N2 is 0 as the permutation will
not give indifference preference order. In the case of
incomplete votes, Voter 3 only gave ranks to N2 and N3. The
rank of N1 is entered as 0. The preference order fit of N1 vs
N2 is 0 as it is possible to find the missing preference order in
the permutation. As there is no N4 candidate, we only have 2
columns in the fitness matrices.
Following the same procedure for the preference orders in
Permutation 1 against 4 voters, we got the 4x2 matrices
shown in Table 2. Figure 3 demonstrates the 6 fitness
matrices for the full permutations by continually comparing
the preference orders for each adjacent pair in each
permutation against the preference orders given by 4 voters.

TABLE 2: FITNESS ORDER MATRICES FOR PERMUTATION 1
AGAINST 4
Preference order fit of
Preference order fit of
Voters
N1 vs N2
N2 vs N3
1
1
1
0
1
2
0
1
3
1
0
4

Fitness for
Permutation 1

Fitness for
Permutation 2

Fitness for
Permutation 3

Fitness for
Permutation 4

Fitness for
Permutation 5

Fitness for
Permutation 6

Figure 3: Fitness Matrices for all permutations
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Step 3: Calculate the sum fits for each permutation.

necessary comparison on the result with the existing ranking
methods, especially with the classical ones. Here we picked
up the two most popular ones – Borda Count [3] and Buklin
[16]. Through the calculations, the ranking results for the 8
projects from the competition is listed as the following:

TABLE 3: TOTAL FITNESS
Permutations
Total Fitness
1
5
2
3
3
3
4
1
5
3
6
3

TABLE 6: COMPARISON RESULTS WITH BORDA COUNT AND
BUKLIN
Project No.#
Ranking
Borda Count Buklin Sequential Pair Rank
1
6
6
3
2
7
7
1
3
3
3
4
4
5
5
2
5
4
4
7
6
1
1
6
7
2
2
5
8
8
8
8

Step 4: Find the maximum fitness and return the
corresponding permutation (Optimal Solution).
TABLE 4: OPTIMAL SOLUTION
Permutations
N1
N2
1
1
2

N3
3

In this example, the ranking for the 3 candidates which
appears in the Permutation 1 is the optimal solution to fit with
voters’ preference order among 3 candidates.
IV. APPLICATION
Given the comparison of the permutations, this algorithm
is one of the single-winner voting systems that allows partial
ranking. We implemented the algorithm in a real event to find
the winner by using R. R is one of the popular language and
open source platforms to explore, understand, and analyze
data [18]. There were 8 teams participating in the event and
69 ballots in total including 10 ties. Table 5 is the example of
the ballot including tie ranks. The input data is the ranking
order for the teams, from rank 1 as the best to rank 8 as the
worst.
Team
1
3
3
0
4
6
1
3

Team
2
5
3
3
5
4
2
3

TABLE 5: EXAMPLE OF TIE RANKS
Team
Team
Team
Team
Team
3
4
5
6
7
2
3
1
4
6
2
3
2
1
1
2
2
1
0
0
2
1
4
3
2
4
3
4
3
3
2
2
1
2
1
1
4
2
6
4

Team
8
7
1
0
6
3
2
4

In this event, the ballots we gathered include incomplete
votes, as not every voter were able to attend the whole event.
As shown in the table 4, we also had tie in the ballot. Our
algorithm did allow these ballots enter as input and handle
them accordingly. The permutations of 8 candidates are
40320. The maximum fitness in this event is 235 and it gave
us about 1% of full permutations multiple optima to help us
find the winner and full rank.
V. COMPARISON WITH BORDA COUNT AND BUKLIN
After using the sequential pair rank for the real dataset for
a ranking result with the ballet data, there would also be a

From the comparison above, it is showing that to the real
dataset we were using, the results from Borda Count [3] and
Buklin [16] had shown a consistent result, while they are very
different from the results of the Sequential Pair Rank. This
difference on the ranking result is not only showing the
different focusing perspectives from the different methods,
but also showing the different application areas of the
different methods. And there were other disadvantages
showing on Borda Count [3] and Buklin [16] while testing
out this comparison results.
Firstly, Sequential Pair Rank has a different designing
perspective from the 2 classical methods. For Borda Count
and Buklin, they were focusing on every single candidate and
looking for the true winner from the competition. Under this
assumption of these methods, the relative positions among
each of the candidates would be ignored because the result is
only relevant for the winner. On the other hand, Sequential
Pair Rank is looking for the closest ranking order from the
votes comparing with the full permutation, which means the
target of Sequential Pair Rank is looking for the whole
ranking order rather than the winner candidate. The results
from Sequential Pair Rank may different from other methods
because it is seeking for the most relevant relative order
which could serve the overall opinion from the voters to the
whole set of candidates which got the most agreements from
all the voters.
Secondly, Sequential Pair Rank has the advantage on
strategic planning for picking up the right sequence order of
all the projects. From the management perspective, if the
company would like to pick up the only project to do in the
period of time, they may need to pick up the winner through
the voting. For most of the time, for the project managers in
the company, they need to “undertake detailed planning to
ensure that the activities performed during the execution
phase of the project are properly sequenced, resourced,
executed and controlled. [20]” So it might be more useful for
the project planers to know the priority orders of all the
possible projects along with the consideration of the
agreements from the voters, because the voters are from
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different departments with different concerns of their limited
resources at the period. Furthermore, we were not really
looking for get rid of the ties at this stage. The tie rankings
would provide more options for the project planners to take a
deep thought on that. The resources, personal skills,
management environments, and the real-time situations may
be changed along the times, so they could have the
flexibilities to adjust the overall plans.
During the comparison process, the disadvantages of
Borda Count and Buklin method are also coming out along
with the dataset. For Borda Count, the setup of the weight
scores would have impact on the final orders, especially on
the first place winner. For Buklin method, there would be
same probabilities for different candidates as the same order
places, which would increase the difficulty on picking up the
right one for the winner if there would not allow any ties. If
using the Sequential Pair Rank methods, there would be these
kinds of problems.
VI. DISCUSSIONS
From the previous application case, the team was also be
able to output the final rank. By revisiting the ballots, there
were several concerns.
First of all, the technics on interoperating data from the
ballots would affect the dataset, especially with ties. The
original assumption of the Sequential Pair Rank system was
inputting different ranks to different candidates. In the real
situation, there were judges that gave out the same rank to
different candidates, or even different ranks to a same
candidate. These ballots would be considered as a bias for the
data entry.
Secondly, considering about the partial ranks, we could
not simply apply the majority rule. During the competition,
since the ballots were collected in the afternoon, the audience
may just provide partial ranks for the projects they could
remember. There were more audiences voted for the projects
in the afternoon rather than the projects in the morning, and
Sequential Pair Rank could tolerate this situation.
Thirdly, the design on paper ballots should be improved.
If just given out the index number of the candidates, the ranks
from 1~8 as the best to the worst, then let the public judges
just fill in a single index number to the position of ranks, the
data entry could be more accurate. This may also reduce the
ties appears from the ballots.
VII. FUTURE WORK
Firstly, the single-direction pairwise comparison makes
the last project listed never get its pairwise computation with
another project, which increased the number of multiple
optima. Using a comparison with each pair of the candidates
could be a possible solution. Secondly, if part of the
audiences only gave ranks to the morning projects, while
another part only gave ranks to the afternoon projects, the
whole dataset would be divided into two parts with two

winners – one for the morning and one for the afternoon. In
this case, an additional tie-breaking function should be added.
Furthermore, through some more literature researches,
there were some scholars tried to make extensions on existed
methods in order to make them work for partially voting,
especially for the Borda Count. Through the research of
David Polett of Bard College [21], he was trying to do a
mathematical analysis of Borda Count with the Non-Linear
Preferences and partially voting. They “have successfully
developed an extension of Linear Borda which allows voters
to use partially ordered ballots while still allocating ballot
Borda Scores in a manner that is perfectly compatible with
linear, bucket and graded poset ballots. [21]” by using
“Structure Chains” which referred to the logical comparison
relationships among the candidates and re-structured scores
for the voting. Although the extension on Borda Count would
satisfy the situation, but there are still leak of proofs on if it
could be used effectively for non-linear ballots through Borda
Count. Also other scholars also researched on the
computational impact of partial votes [22]. They also claimed
that, “with an elimination style voting rule like single
transferable vote, partial voting does not change the situations
where strategic voting is possible; with scoring rules and
rules based on the tournament graph, partial voting can
increase the situations. [22]” As the consequence, “the
computational complexity of computing a strategic vote can
change [22]” with the partial order. So generally, the
complexity of the computing process would be increased
significantly through different kinds of voting algorithm. A
further comparing research on the processes with the partial
votes would also be a future research topic.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regarding to the application case and analysis, the most
creative points of Sequential Pair Rank system are:
1. Comparing the ranking orders of each pair of the
candidates to the full permutations and the final ranking
result would never show ties;
2. Not focusing on picking a single-winner, but on
determining the full ranks;
3. Providing multiple optimal ranking orders that have the
same maximum fit value to each judge’s rank;
4. Tolerating the partial ranks and tie ranks.
The system could be potentially used for the project
management purpose, as a method on scanning the potential
projects at the very front end. The value to have the multiple
optima would provide more potential options, and increasing
the flexibilities of project management process. Furthermore,
the Sequential Pair Rank system could potentially be
developed and associated with other high-resolution decision
making tools.
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